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INSURANCE LAW PRINCIPLES
IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT:
COMPENSATING LOSSES CAUSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE
CRAIG BROWN AND SARA SECK*
This article examines the challenges of paying for
loss caused by climate change. It discusses how weatherrelated harms might become uninsurable by private
companies in the future as the adverse effects of climate
change increase in severity. Additionally, this article
recognizes the difficulty in imposing civil liability on
wrongdoers for climate-related harms, and explores
options for state-sponsored or state-subsidized
insurance. Finally, the authors examine possibilities for
an international insurance fund, but eventually conclude
that such a fund would unlikely be endorsed at the
international level and would not benefit Canadians.

Cet article porte sur les défis que le fait de payer les
pertes causées par le changement climatique. Il examine
notamment la manière dont les dommages causés par le
climat pourraient ne plus être assurables à l’avenir par
les entreprises privées, alors que les effets indésirables
du changement climatique continuent de s’aggraver. De
plus, cet article reconnaît la difficulté d’imposer une
assurance civile à l’égard des auteurs de méfaits pour
les dommages reliés au changement climatique; l’article
examine les options d’une assurance offerte sous l’égide
d’État ou subventionnée par celui-ci. Enfin, l’auteur
examine la possibilité d’une caisse de prévoyance
internationale, mais arrive à la conclusion qu’une telle
caisse ne serait probablement pas acceptée sur le plan
international et ne profiterait pas aux Canadiens.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Anthropogenic climate change presents serious challenges, not least the problem of paying
for the losses it causes. In this article we examine this problem and consider possible
solutions, recognizing at the outset the complexities involved, such as the difficulty of
establishing cause and effect in individual cases and the international scope of the problem.
There can be no doubt there is a problem. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), consisting of 93 contributing authors from 18 countries,1 examined
the likely effects of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on the world’s climate.2
Using several models, taking into account differences between them,3 the panel predicted that
the global mean surface temperature will increase over the next century, most likely by about
3/C.4 There is significant consensus that this warming is caused by, and will be proportional
to, anthropogenic GHG emissions.5 Expected effects are that heat waves will become more
intense and frequent, intense precipitation and droughts will increase, and glaciers, ice caps,
and permafrost will decrease, contributing to sea level rise. Resultant effects on the climate
include more frequent and more severe floods, tornados, hurricanes, and blizzards.6
As the risks of these events both increase and become more unpredictable, insurance
against them will become less widely available. Indeed, it is possible that weather related
harms may become uninsurable in the future as the adverse consequences of climate change
increase in severity.7 Liability insurance will be of limited utility because underlying tort
actions will be problematic, owing to difficulties in connecting the activities of specific
defendants to harm suffered by specific plaintiffs. This is compounded by the fact that the
cause and effect, in so far as it can be identified at all, occurs across international boundaries.
This in turn will make traditional insurance even more problematic because it will reduce the
chances of recouping losses through subrogation.8
It is true that these problems may be mitigated in various ways, at least in part.
Reinsurance allows insurers to spread risks by insuring themselves against the financial
1

2

3
4
5

6
7

8

Represented countries include: the United States, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Senegal, the United
Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Canada, China, Russia, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand, the Netherlands,
Monaco, Finland, and India.
Gerald A Meehl et al, “Global Climate Projections” in S Solomon et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: The
Physical Science Basis — Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 747.
Ibid at 749.
Ibid.
Ibid. See also “A New Assessment of Global Warming,” online: Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature
<http://berkeleyearth.org/study/>; “Dr. Muller’s Findings,” Editorial, The New York Times (3 November
2011), online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/dr-mullers-findings
-on-global-warming.html>.
Meehl et al, ibid at 750-51.
Ibid. See also Evan Mills, “Insurance in a Climate of Change,” (2005) 309 Science 1040; Evan Mills,
Richard J Roth, Jr & Eugene Lecomte, “Availability and Affordability of Insurance Under Climate
Change: A Growing Challenge for the United States” (2006) 25:2 Journal of Insurance Regulation 109;
“Environment,” online: Lloyd’s <http:/www.lloyds.com/Lloyds/Corporate-Responsibility/Environ
ment>.
Subrogation, as it applies to insurance law, ensures that (a) insurance claimants do not recover more than
the value of their losses by allowing insurers, rather than the claimants themselves, to exercise any
rights, such as tort rights, against third parties; and (b) negligent causers of harm do not escape liability.
See Craig Brown, Insurance Law in Canada, 7th student ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) ch 13 [Brown,
Insurance Law]. To the extent subrogation operates in relation to environmental claims, it reinforces the
“polluter pays” principle.
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stresses caused by having to pay a large number of claims in a short time, such as those
arising from a major hurricane. Reinsurance companies are typically international in the
scope of their business, so the risks are spread globally. A relatively recent alternative
mechanism by which insurers have begun to spread risks is catastrophe bonds. These bonds,
typically issued by insurers, provide investors with attractive returns, but which are forfeited
in the event of a specified catastrophe such as a major flood or hurricane.9 As major weather
events increase in frequency and severity, however, reinsurers can be expected to respond
by raising premiums and reducing the scope of risks they are prepared to cover,10 and
investors are likely to become less prepared to buy catastrophe bonds.
If the private insurance market cannot adequately provide protection against the financial
consequences of major weather events, the alternative is that it be provided by government,
or at least some form of public-private partnership. In some countries, government programs
have been created to deal with risk environments too volatile for the private insurance
industry to handle by itself, if at all. In some, premiums for private insurance are subsidized.
In others, such as those operated by the New Zealand Earthquake Commission and the
British Columbia Disaster program, government agencies are the insurers. In either case, the
cost of providing compensation is subsidized by taxpayers.
In this article, we will first outline how climate change is expected to impact Canadian
insurers, and their anticipated response. Second, we will explore the first principles that
inform the nature and purpose of insurance law. Third, we will outline the relationship
between tort law and liability insurance and examine the complications that arise in the
climate context. Next, after briefly addressing how judges and legislators could respond to
the climate and insurance problem, we will provide examples of public law models of
insurance, including fire insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, automobile insurance,
as well as natural disaster insurance examples from New Zealand, the United States, and
British Columbia.
Having concluded that there is a role for government involvement in a public insurance
scheme to address climate related harms in Canada, we will turn to international law in order
to determine whether it would be possible, first in theory and then in practice, for an
international climate compensation fund to contribute to domestic state public insurance
schemes in the climate context. While this part will demonstrate that such a fund is possible
in theory, we will conclude that not only would this approach be unlikely to be endorsed at
the international level, but also that it would ultimately be unhelpful for the Canadian climate
insurance problem. Instead, we will conclude by offering a range of possible proposals for
future consideration.

9
10

See J David Cummins, “CAT Bonds and Other Risk-Linked Securities: State of the Market and Recent
Developments” (2008) 11:1 Risk Management and Insurance Review 23.
WJW Botzen & JCJM van den Bergh, “Insurance Against Climate Change and Flooding in the
Netherlands: Present, Future, and Comparison with Other Countries” (2008) 28:2 Risk Analysis 413 at
421.
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II. INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE11
In 2000, Angus Ross listed the following consequences of climate change for Canada that
would have implications for insurers:12
•

There will be more frequent extreme “precipitation events,” such as tornadoes and
hail occurring in more places. Whereas such an event was previously expected to
happen once in 80 years, it would, with the onset of climate change, be expected to
happen every ten years.

•

There will be more droughts and more floods (among the consequences of which
will be increased pollution from such events as leakage from oil tanks and runoff
from farms). There will also be a greater frequency of windstorms, with increases
in wind loads.

•

The Northwest Passage will be open to significantly greater volumes of traffic,
possibly as much as 30 vessels a day. On the other hand, lower water levels in the
Great Lakes will create new shipping hazards of grounding.

•

Forest fires will occur more frequently.

•

Disease will increase in that there will be more respiratory disorders, tropical
diseases will migrate northward, and there will be more water contamination by
parasites, bacteria, and protozoa.

•

The elimination of the permafrost in the north will create a freezing-thawing cycle
that will impact oil and gas lines and building foundations, and the elimination of
ice highways will make transportation and repairs more costly.

•

Milder winter weather will result in more use of motor vehicles, particularly
motorcycles.13

11

12

13

In this section we discuss climate change in relation to first party insurance. For a discussion of
implications for liability insurance, see Jeffrey W Stempel, “Insurance and Climate Change Litigation”
in William CG Burns & Hari M Osofsky, eds, Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and
International Approaches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 230 at 230ff. For liability
insurance considerations to be relevant, tort law has to be viable as a means of obtaining compensation
for climate-related harms. As discussed below, this is unlikely in Canada.
Angus H Ross, “Reflections on the Future — Climate Change and its Impacts on the Insurance Industry”
(9 June 2000), online: Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction <http://www.iclr.org/images/2000_
June_AngusRoss_Presentation.pdf>. See also Meehl et al, supra note 2.
For additional and more recent, but consistent, analyses, see “The vanishing north: There are benefits
in the melting of the Arctic, but the risks are much greater,” The Economist 403:8789 (16 June 2012)
13, online: The Economist <http://www.economist.com/node/21556921> [“The Vanishing North”];
Chris Furgal & Terry D Prowse, “Northern Canada” in Donald S Lemmen et al, eds, From Impacts to
Adaptation: Canada in a Changing Climate 2007 (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada, 2008) 57;
Quentin Chiotti & Beth Lavender, “Ontario” in Lemmen et al, ibid, 227; Liette Vasseur & Norm R
Catto, “Atlantic Canada” in Lemmen et al, ibid, 119; Blair Feltmate & Jason Thistlethwaite, Climate
Change Adaptation: A Priorities Plan for Canada (Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 2012), online:
Adapt Now Canada <http://www.adaptnowcanada.ca/report/>; Michael V’inkin Lee, “Climate change
to bring more severe wildfires to B.C.: report,” The Vancouver Sun (7 June 2012), online: The
Vancouver Sun <http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Climate+change+bring+more+severe+wildfires+
report/6748 403/story.html>; Daniel-Stefan Paraschiv, “Insurance Against Losses from Natural
Disasters” (2011) 3:2 Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 224; “Climate change concerns
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All this will affect insurance. There are obvious implications for insurance on property,
including buildings, ships and cargo, forests, oil and gas pipelines, motor vehicles, and crops.
Flood insurance, where available (while commonly excluded in homeowners policies, flood
is usually covered under “all risk” commercial policies) will be more expensive. Various
forms of liability insurance will also be affected. Farmers will face greater exposure to
liability for fecal and chemical runoff after floods, engineers and builders will be subject to
higher standards in respect to the design and construction of buildings, and motorists and
motorcyclists will have greater exposure to liability on the roads.14 There will be increased
exposure for credit risks (surety and guarantee insurance) because construction projects, for
example, face a greater likelihood of weather-related delays or cancellation. Further, present
conceptions of “catastrophe” will be challenged in that the occurrence of a “continuous
event” of, say, 72 hours (typically necessary to trigger catastrophe insurance), will become
commonplace.15 Life, health and accident, and sickness insurance will also be affected.
Death, disease, or disability from climate-related causes will increase. Without relevant
exclusions, this will increase insurers’ exposure. All of this will demand new approaches to
underwriting.16
While overall it can be predicted with a degree of confidence that, assuming the validity
of scientific predictions, this alarming increase in risk will occur, the precise rate of increase
in the occurrence of particular hazards in any given year remains unpredictable, and
unpredictability of risk is what insurers fear most. When faced with unpredictability, they
assume the worst and price accordingly, or decline to cover that hazard at all. Therefore,
insurers’ response to all these predicted consequences of climate change will be either to
cease covering particular hazards entirely, or at the least to increase premiums.17
III. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF INSURANCE LAW
These choices (whether to insure and what premiums to charge) are not only permitted by
insurance law, they are encouraged by it. At the heart of all insurance law is the notion that
insurance is about the transfer of risk. People facing the prospect (but not the certainty) of
specified kinds of loss are provided protection from the financial consequences of such loss
should it occur. To the extent insurance is created by contract, this distinguishes insurance
from other types of contracts and explains numerous rules peculiar to insurance law. Given
two basic facts in play — potentially devastating loss to the insured and the uncertainty of

14
15
16
17

raised by insurance industry,” CBC News (23 February 2012), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca
news/canada/new-brunswick/story/2012/02/23/nb-climate-change-insurance-836.html>; Peter Sinclair,
“Insurance Companies Feeling the Effects of Climate Change,” The Oil Price (12 December 2011),
online: OilPrice.com <http://oilprice.com/The-Environment/Global-Warming/Insurance-CompaniesFeeling-The-Effects-Of-Climate-Change.html>.
At present, pricing of motorcycle insurance is based on the assumption that the vehicle will be used for
seven to eight months a year only.
See Ernst Rauch, “Effects of Climate Change on the Insurance Industry” (2007) 43(A) Stan J Int’l L 239.
Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B Hecht, “Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: Insurance RiskManagement Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change” (2007) 43(A) Stan J Int’l L 251.
For the view that insurers are exaggerating these concerns to justify high premiums and government
assistance, see J Robert Hunter, “Property/Casualty Insurance in 2008: Overpriced Insurance and
Underpaid Claims Result in Unjustified Profits, Padded Reserves, and Excessive Capitalization” (10
January 2008), online: Consumer Federation of America <http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.
consumerfed.org/file/finance/2008Insurance_White_Paper.pdf>. See also “Climate blamed in insurance
losses,” CBC News (3 January 2011), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/
2011/01/03/insurance-losses-climate-change.html>.
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its happening — it has been thought necessary to include in insurance law several unique
rules. In general terms, it can be said that the purpose of insurance law is to strike an
appropriate balance between the interests of those who face or have suffered loss and the
interests of the organizations, public or private, whose role is to provide insurance against
that loss. That is easy enough to see in the law relating to insurance contracts. Once insurer
and insured have consented to contractual relations, the law’s role is to mediate between the
possibly conflicting reasonable expectations each party has arising from the contract. But this
is limited to those circumstances where there is a contract. Where there is no contract, say
because the insurer refuses to accept the prospective insured’s offer, a narrow concept of
insurance law has nothing more to provide.
Accordingly, if insurers choose not to offer certain types of coverage because climate
change has made them unprofitable, people who face losses no longer covered will not be
protected by insurance law (so defined) because it simply does not apply. However, at least
in Canada, some insurance law, almost always in the form of legislation, has the purpose of
making sure that coverage is available for certain types of loss when, left to the market and
private contract law, it might not be available to some or even all who need it. In other
words, some insurance law addresses not only the transfer of risk when it happens, but also
mandates that the risk be transferred and creates mechanisms by which this is possible.
Thus, if a legislature so desired, insurance law could be created to require that insurance
be made available where an unregulated market would not provide it. But a legislature is
unlikely to impose upon insurers obligations to provide specific coverage at a specific
premium without regard to realistic actuarial considerations. If the predictions mentioned
previously hold true and certain types of catastrophic loss become uninsurable according to
the principles of private insurance, mandatory provisions of coverage for inadequate
premiums would be a recipe for financial calamity. Even mandated coverage must comply
with basic insurance business principles.
Not surprisingly, these principles of insurance are reflected in the principles of insurance
law.18 Among these is the principle of fortuity. Insurers can provide protection against the
financial consequences of loss for a fraction of the value of that loss because they afford
similar protection to multiple insureds knowing that loss is going to happen to a relative few
of them, and it is not known in advance which of them will suffer loss. The key is the
randomness of loss in terms of when it happens, to whom it happens, and its extent.
Insurance law seeks to uphold the fortuity principle, and thereby assist the continuing
viability of insurers, primarily through rules pertaining to the interpretation of insurance
policies. For example, it is presumed that an insurance contract is not intended to provide for
circumstances where the loss is brought about deliberately by the insured person. Most often
this notion is given effect in disputes about the meaning of “accident” or “accidental” in
policy wording.19 But it is not necessary for a policy specifically to restrict coverage to
unintentional conduct for the fortuity principle to apply. It is a presumption that can only be

18
19

See Brown, Insurance Law, supra note 8 at ch 1.
See e.g. Canadian Indemnity Co v Walkem Machinery & Equipment Ltd, [1976] 1 SCR 309; Cooperative Fire & Casualty Co v Saindon, [1976] 1 SCR 735.

COMPENSATING LOSSES CAUSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE

547

overridden by express language. It is also presumed that the parties to an insurance contract
intend that there be no coverage where the loss is certain to happen, as in the case of normal
wear and tear to property or other inevitable damage.20 Even life insurance triggered by
death, the quintessential inevitability, operates on the fortuity principle because the time of
death is uncertain.
As the likelihood of potential loss becomes less uncertain, insurers respond in one or both
of two ways. They limit coverage through more restrictive insuring agreements or wider
exclusions (or, indeed, withdraw from the particular type of coverage entirely) or they
increase premiums. Without specific legislation to the contrary, insurance law permits this.
When the tighter market is judged to be sufficiently problematic in social terms, there is
pressure for new legislation, either to regulate insurers’ pricing policies, for direct
government involvement in the supply of insurance, or for changes to insurance and related
compensation law.21
Paradoxically, the same outcomes arise when loss becomes too uncertain in the sense that
its frequency and severity defy a degree of predictability with which underwriters are
comfortable. In these circumstances, costing assumptions and other underwriting decisions
are based on worst-case scenarios. It is assumed that loss will happen often and will always
be severe. In other words, highly unpredictable loss is treated as if it is almost certain.
Another principle of insurance law is consumer protection. This is reflected in legislation
and regulation as well as judge-made rules. In the end, though, if insurers in the private
market cannot make it work because of the prevailing risk environment, “consumers” (those
facing the risk and needing coverage) are not protected. This is where other solutions become
necessary and “insurance law” assumes a larger dimension.
IV. LIABILITY INSURANCE
In some circumstances, liability insurance may provide funds to compensate climate
related loss. This would occur when a person holding liability insurance is sued successfully
for causing or contributing to the loss suffered. In the context under consideration here, that
would mean the insured defendant has caused a climate effect which has in turn caused the
loss. That requires that the plaintiff has been able to successfully argue that the elements of
a tort exist. The most likely candidates are negligence and nuisance. Where an insurer can
show that the insured acted intentionally (including imputed intent), it will usually be
permitted to deny payment. This may be because of an operative exclusion clause or, more
generally, because the loss was not, from the insured’s perspective, fortuitous. In Robinson
v. Evans Bros Pty Ltd.,22 the harm to a market gardener’s crops from the pollution emitted
by an adjacent brick factory was held not to have been caused “accidentally” for purposes
of liability insurance coverage. In effect, intention to cause the harm was imputed to the
defendant. It is also possible in such cases to argue that the invasion of noxious substances

20
21
22

See e.g. British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co, Limited v Gaunt, [1921] 2 AC 41 (HL).
See Craig Brown, “No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Ontario: A Long and Complicated Story” (1998)
66:3 Assurances 399 [Brown, “No-Fault Automobile Insurance”].
(1968), [1969] VR 885 (SC).
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is both direct and physical.23 But any connection that can be established between a GHG
emitter, or even a group of them, and illness, personal injury, or property damage suffered
by a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs, is clearly indirect. Therefore, even if the result can be
shown to have been so highly likely as to invoke imputed intent, and even if the impact can
be characterized as a physical invasion, an action in trespass is unlikely to be successful.24
A.

NEGLIGENCE

Given increasing evidence connecting certain kinds of pollution to climate change, it is
not implausible to claim that this connection is reasonably foreseeable from the standpoint
of polluters. Failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent or reduce foreseeable harm is
negligence. However, that alone does not mean that a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs could
easily succeed in a negligence action against a polluting defendant. A successful action
requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant owed him or her a duty of care, that the
duty was breached, that the breach of duty caused the harm, and that the harm was not too
remote. Each of these requirements represents a significant obstacle in the context of
potential climate change litigation.
1.

DUTY

In Canada, the duty of care upon which a negligence action is founded is defined by a
three-part test. First, it must be reasonably foreseeable from the defendant’s point of view
that negligent performance of an activity could result in harm to the plaintiff. Second, there
must be a degree of proximity between the defendant and plaintiff such that it is fair and
reasonably predictable that negligently caused harm would result in legal liability. Third,
imposition of a duty should not produce negative consequences for society that, as a matter
of policy, outweigh the benefits of liability.25
As mentioned, a court might accept that contribution to climate change is a foreseeable
result of certain pollution producing activities. It is a different matter whether the court would
regard a person engaged in such an activity as “proximate” to a person who suffered harm
because of climate change. The principal indicator of proximity in this sense is whether the
posited duty falls within, or is analogous to, a category of duty that has been previously
accepted by the courts and therefore predictable by potential defendants. While liability in
negligence is already recognised where a defendant contaminates the property of another,26
harm of the kind associated with climate change (given the way it arises) is arguably in a
different category. Although concerns about the appropriateness of liability might more
correctly be addressed under the headings of policy, causation, or remoteness, a court could,
for the same reasons, simply declare that the parties are insufficiently proximate.

23
24

25
26

See e.g. Kerr v Revelstoke Building Materials Ltd (1976), 71 DLR (3d) 134 (Alta SC).
The directness requirement would be avoided if a court accepted an argument, based on the old action
of trespass on the case, that harm indirectly but intentionally caused is actionable. See e.g. Wilkinson v
Downton, [1897] 2 QB 57, involving intentional infliction of nervous shock. However, trespass on the
case has now been almost wholly subsumed within the negligence action.
See generally Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537.
See e.g. Ball v Imperial Oil Resources Ltd, 2010 ABCA 111, 477 AR 251; Bingley v Morrison Fuels,
2009 ONCA 319, 95 OR (3d) 191.
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Even if the tests of both foreseeability and proximity are met, a court may still decline to
recognize a duty on broad policy grounds. Liability in negligence for pure economic loss is
limited in Canada primarily because of concerns about indeterminate liability.27 This reflects
a policy choice about loss allocation. It is deemed inappropriate to saddle a defendant with
potential liability “in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class.”28 Given the scale on which climate change and its effects occur, this is a concern that
might well find traction in climate change litigation.
2.

STANDARD OF CARE

A plaintiff suing in negligence for climate change related harm would have to establish
that the defendant had been negligent. This means it must be shown that there was some
conduct or omission falling below a standard that could reasonably be expected of the
defendant in the circumstances. This might be a challenge. One could expect arguments from
defendants that compliance with industry standards and/or relevant environmental regulations
reflects reasonable conduct. Moreover, elimination of emissions may mean such high costs,
not only to the emitter but also to the wider community in the form of job losses and the
economic ripple effects, that it would be unreasonable not to continue as before.29
3.

CAUSATION

Perhaps the most difficult issue confronting a plaintiff in a negligence action would be
causation. The plaintiff would have to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that but for the
defendant’s negligence, the harm would not have happened. Although there is a consensus
that human activity contributes to climate change, there is uncertainty about how this activity
interacts with natural phenomena. As the human contribution to climate change is a
collective effort, it is effectively impossible to prove a connection between an individual
defendant’s activity and harm suffered by an individual plaintiff or even class of plaintiffs.30
Even the concept of “material contribution,” which is sometimes used by courts to establish
a causal link when the “but for” test is inadequate,31 would not likely assist in climate change
cases. Again, the difficulty would lie in establishing just how much an individual emitter has
materially increased the risk of harm.
4.

REMOTENESS

If factual causation is established, it is still necessary to confront the legal question of
whether the causal link is too attenuated for liability to be appropriate. If the harm is judged

27
28
29

30

31

See e.g. Hercules Managements Ltd v Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 SCR 165.
Ultramares Corp v Touche (1931), 174 NE 441 (NYCA) at 444.
The so-called “Hand formula” posits that conduct is not negligent where the cost of prevention of harm
produced by the conduct, including the loss of social benefit, outweighs the risk of harm. See United
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to be too remote from the defendant’s negligence, there is no liability. The modern test
employed in Canada is whether the harm is reasonably foreseeable in the sense that it would
be regarded by a reasonable person as a “real risk” and not dismissed as “far-fetched.”32 It
could be argued that, given the publicity surrounding climate change, it is not far-fetched to
expect that greenhouse gas emissions could lead to climate-related damage. But this is at a
level of generality. Linking a specific defendant with a specific plaintiff might well be
considered too speculative to be foreseeable, even under the modern approach.
5.

DEFENCES

At least for some types of harm, a defendant could reasonably argue that the plaintiff’s
negligence had contributed to the loss. Building a house at a location known to be vulnerable
to floods or hurricanes is an example. In Canada, this would amount to a partial defence
resulting in a reduction of damages. A defendant might also be able to invoke the defence
of inevitable accident.33
B.

NUISANCE

Where a person suffers unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of his or her
property, he or she may sue in private nuisance.34 Interference is unreasonable if the harm
done outweighs the utility of the conduct causing it. As with negligence, reasonableness turns
on a cost-benefit analysis. In nuisance, as in negligence, a plaintiff alleging that a defendant
caused climate related harm would be confronted with the defendant’s claim that his or her
or its conduct provided benefits, such as jobs and other economic advantages, which
outweighed the harm to the plaintiff. Also in common with negligence, the plaintiff(s) would
have the problems of proving causation and countering defences such as contributory
negligence.35
V. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE LAW
Assuming the scientific predictions about climate change and its physical effects are
accurate, and taking at face value insurers’ concerns about the consequences of this for
assessing and pricing risk, what might be the response of insurance law, both judge-made and
legislation (but especially the latter)?
A.

JUDGE-MADE LAW

Historically, the thrust of judge-made law relating to insurance has been the protection of
insurers’ solvency. This explains the principles of fortuity, indemnity, and, to a significant
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extent, utmost good faith. In the face of the challenges expected to arise from climate change,
the concern about financial viability will be paramount. In consequence, the concepts of
fortuity, indemnity, and the insured’s duty of disclosure will assume even greater importance.
But this will mean the application of existing law as opposed to the creation of new law.
In the early 1700s the conditions of the marketplace for insurance, notably the practical
difficulties underwriters had in obtaining accurate information relevant to prospective risks,
impeded the efficient transfer of risk in respect of marine adventures. To rectify this, Lord
Mansfield fashioned the rule of utmost good faith.36 Without citing a single precedent (unless
one counts a quote from Cicero), and referring only to one statute, the Statute of Frauds37
(which had no direct application to the case), he simply declared that contracts of insurance
were subject to a rule requiring applicants for insurance to disclose to underwriters all facts
material to risks for which protection was sought. He said this derived from the “principles
of natural equity, [designed] to prevent fraud.”38
The expected consequences of climate change include significant changes to the insurance
marketplace in that certain kinds of coverage are likely to disappear or be greatly restricted.
This means there is a problem in respect of compensation for loss, perhaps the most
important insurance law principle of all. It is hard to see a modern judge creating a new rule,
regardless of the absence of precedent, in response to market conditions detrimental to
consumers. It is unlikely, for instance, that a case would be decided for a plaintiff simply on
the grounds of “natural equity,” designed to promote the compensation of a victim of a
natural disaster.
There are more subtle ways in which judges may respond to the legal challenges presented
by climate change. This is particularly so when it comes to interpreting insurance policies.
As described above, Canadian courts already recognize and apply the concept of reasonable
expectations when interpreting insurance policies. They also construe coverage clauses more
expansively than exclusion clauses.39 Consider the example of flood loss: a policy might
exclude flood loss or narrow coverage in some other way, such as applying a larger
deductible to that category of loss. In such a case, the term “flood” will be interpreted
narrowly. In British Columbia v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada,40 the British Columbia
Court of Appeal had to interpret the word “flood” in a clause stating that losses resulting
from such events were subject to a deductible much greater than for other types of loss. After
heavy rain, water overflowed a diversion pipe and damaged partially set concrete being
installed to create a permanent channel for a stream. Despite the fact that the policy contained
a definition of “flood,” which included “the rising of, the breaking out or the overflow of any
body of water,”41 the Court held that the loss in question was not caused by flood.42
Cases turning on the interpretation of individual policies, however, rarely reflect a
dramatic and permanent change in the law. Insurers can respond by changing the wording
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of policies to negate, prospectively at least, the effect of an adverse judgment. It is true that,
in a fire insurance policy, the new wording may be nullified by a court.43 In most Canadian
provinces, a court is empowered by legislation to strike down any term of a fire insurance
contract it deems to be unjust or unreasonable.44 This has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Canada to allow a court to negate not only a term falling below the required
standard, but also a term that, while not unjust or unreasonable on its face, has an
unreasonable or unjust effect when applied in a particular case.45 However, while it is not
impossible that a court, in the aftermath of an extreme climate event causing fire damage,
would see denial of a claim as unjust or unreasonable and use this section to negate an
exclusion clause entirely, it is surely unlikely.
Still, none of this would represent a fundamental change to insurance law. A change
ensuring all the underlying principles of insurance law are maintained would have to come
through legislation.
B.

LEGISLATION

As some have suggested, one response to the insurance-related implications of climate
change may be greater scrutiny of insurers’ accounting processes and more detailed reporting
of their costs and loss ratios to ensure that climate change is not used improperly as an
excuse to increase premiums.46
However, if (assuming that scientific and economic forecasts hold) the private insurance
market will indeed be unable to cover the radically increased risks of injury, disease, and
especially property damage that climate change will bring, and thus be unable to provide
comprehensive and affordable coverage as climate related risks increase, legislation will be
needed to establish a compensation scheme to make up for the predicted shortcomings of
private insurance. For workers’ compensation and insurance for injuries sustained in motor
vehicle accidents, Canadian legislatures established new rules and created institutions to give
them effect. In some cases they even curtailed the activities of the private insurance industry
in order to provide more comprehensive and more affordable coverage.47 In other cases, they
set up forms of public-private partnerships, such as the British Columbia Disaster Financial
Assistance Program. Broadly similar arrangements have been developed in other
jurisdictions. As described below, some of these historical precedents provide, if not models,
at least a starting point for the discussion.
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VI. A FEW HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
A.

FIRE INSURANCE

It is claimed that in Syria around 1500 B.C. there existed a scheme funded by “public
taxation to pay for fire, flood, or drought losses suffered by members of the community.”48
In the middle ages in Europe, churches and guilds provided protection in respect of fire,
flood, and robbery “through funds raised by collection or assessment.”49 In Britain (and
subsequently North America), this form of insurance became largely a matter for private
enterprise. The key event seems to have been the great fire of London in 1666. A property
developer involved in the reconstruction of the city offered, as an incentive to purchasers,
to rebuild houses if subsequently destroyed by fire again. This idea was so well-received that
the developer was encouraged to offer, for a price, the same promise in respect of houses
built by others.50 The success of this venture led to the establishment of other insurance
companies.51
The insurance industry accompanied the European settlement of what eventually became
Canada. In the face of some company failures and occasional industry malfeasance,
government intervention, both federal and provincial, ensued.52 This involved measures
designed to make sure insurance companies were financially sound, both at creation and on
an ongoing basis. Eventually, at the provincial level, there was also detailed intervention in
the contractual relationship between insurer and insured. Statutory conditions were imposed
on contracts along with other restrictions on freedom of contract, including a provision that
no term of a fire insurance contract is binding on the insured if it is deemed by a court to be
unjust or unreasonable.53
This sequence follows a familiar historical pattern in insurance law. A major event or
other development highlights an unprotected risk. Insurance products are developed to
address that risk. Problems arise with the market for those products or with the products
themselves so that consumers fail to get the protection needed. The legislature, regulators,
and/or the courts devise ways to address those problems. In the case of fire insurance,
legislative intervention in Canada has yet to take the form of direct government involvement
in the market, but in other arenas that has been the response.
B.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

Workers’ compensation, as we know it today, originated in Germany.54 Like other forms
of financial protection mentioned above in relation to fire insurance, it is traceable to the
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early guild system that provided disability, sickness, and death benefits funded by
contributions from employers and employees. However, when the industrial revolution
radically changed the scope and nature of workplace injury, impetus developed for universal,
state run protection. In the 1880s, under pressure from a growing socialist movement,
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck introduced a scheme bearing the hallmarks of the system we
know in Canada today: compulsory, state run, and financed by employers and workers.55
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, common law jurisdictions copied this basic model. Prior
to that, compensation for workplace injuries had been left to the law of negligence. An
injured worker (or his family in the case of a fatal injury) had to sue his employer, or
whoever else caused the injury through negligence. This presented significant obstacles to
recovery. First, it was necessary to establish the defendant’s fault. It has been suggested that,
in Canada, employers were at fault in only a small minority of cases.56 Second, even where
there might have been some negligence on the employer’s part, it is likely a defence would
have been available to negate liability. The employer was not liable if the plaintiff was held
to have voluntarily assumed the risk that had eventuated. Unlike today, it was a complete
defence if the plaintiff had been negligent in a way that contributed to the injury. Similarly,
the “fellow-servant rule” held that the contributing negligence of a co-worker also provided
the employer with a defence.57 Third, there were the practical difficulties of paying legal fees,
not to mention medical expenses and daily living costs, pending the outcome of litigation,
which could take years.58
The result was that many people were exposed to risk without any realistic chance of
compensation should the risk manifest itself in injury. The first attempts to deal with this
problem reduced the scope of defences to negligence actions.59 This was effective in that
more than half the actions brought subsequently were successful.60 But it provided impetus
for more radical change. On the one hand, it remained necessary to prove fault on the part
of the employer, so injured workers still faced that hurdle as well as the practical difficulties
in mounting litigation referred to above. In other words, as a compensation scheme, it
remained far from perfect. On the other hand, employers now faced increased exposure to
litigation, both damages and legal costs, motivating them to seek a better system.
This led to legislation not only dealing with tort rules, but also setting up schemes that
would actually provide compensation. These differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In
Britain, employers were charged with providing limited compensation on a no-fault basis,
but workers retained the right to opt instead for a negligence claim if that was to their
advantage.61 In the US, some states adopted schemes run by a state monopoly, while others
charged private insurers with the job.62
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In Ontario, the Workman’s Compensation Act63 of 1915 introduced a government run
scheme. It was “no-fault” in the sense that workers gave up their right to sue their employers
even if the latter were negligent in causing injury. In return, workers were guaranteed
compensation for work related injuries without regard to fault. It was funded by employer
contributions (varied according to accident experience) and participation was compulsory.
The fund was collected and payments administered by a government agency.64
C.

AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS

Almost since the advent of the automobile, Canadian legislatures have been tinkering with
automobile insurance law to improve the lot of motor vehicle accident victims seeking
compensation. Initially this had mostly to do with tort law and its sibling, liability insurance,
since these provided the principal means of obtaining compensation in motor vehicle
accidents. The burden of proof was reversed in cases where damage or injury was caused by
a motor vehicle (other than to another vehicle).65 Owners of motor vehicles were made liable
for injuries caused by people driving their vehicles with their consent,66 and insurers were
precluded from relying on lack of privity of contract to deny claims in respect of these
cases.67 Insurers were also precluded from denying claims merely because the insured people
had been in breach of criminal or traffic laws when causing accidents.68 Victims of motor
vehicle accidents were given direct rights of action against the insurers of motorists whose
negligence had caused them injury, even where those insured motorists had acted in breach
of the insurance contract.69
Not much of this availed an accident victim if the defendant motorist was not insured.
Perhaps most significant for the subject of this article, provinces legislated incentives to
induce owners of motor vehicles to buy liability insurance. This took the form of penalties
imposed on a motorist, not for driving without insurance, but for not having it in the event
of an accident she or he caused.70 This was supplemented by the creation of publicly
administered funds called Unsatisfied Judgment Funds from which payment was made to
victims whose injuries were caused by uninsured or unidentified motorists.71 The funds were
contributed by motorists who, upon registering their vehicles, could not show proof of
insurance. Under threat of loss of driving privileges, these people also had to reimburse the
fund for any losses they caused.72
Eventually, all provinces enacted compulsory automobile insurance regimes. It is a
criminal offence to own a motor vehicle that is not insured when operated on a highway.73
Special arrangements are made to provide insurance for high-risk applicants. In Ontario, for
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example, insurers are required to participate in a pooling arrangement called the “Facility
Association” to which brokers refer such people.74 Motorists now carry, as part of their
compulsory insurance, uninsured and unidentified motorist coverage against the chance of
being injured by such a person.
All this still requires claimants to identify a defendant, prove negligence, counter any
allegations of contributory negligence, and establish quantum of damages. Even for
successful claimants, this takes significant time and money, and it leaves some victims of
accidents (those in single vehicle accidents for example) uncompensated. To address these
gaps in coverage, every Canadian jurisdiction has enacted some form of no-fault insurance,
either to replace or to supplement tort law and/or liability insurance.75
In British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, and Saskatchewan, compulsory automobile
insurance is administered by government agencies created for that purpose. Private insurers,
if they operate at all, are restricted to selling optional coverage additional to the compulsory
package. These bodies reflect the legislative judgment that the private insurance market
cannot provide necessary coverage at reasonable cost. In other words, without government
involvement, the risks faced by motorists are not adequately covered at reasonable premium
levels.
In other jurisdictions, compulsory coverage continues to be provided by the private
market. But this coverage is subject to heavy government control. The terms of coverage are
largely dictated by statute or regulation,76 or at least subject to a system of approval by
regulators.77 In some provinces, premiums are subject to approval by regulators as well.78
Even where the provision of insurance is left to the private sector, insurers, as quasi-public
authorities, are used as instruments of public policy.
It is pertinent to note here that significant changes in the auto insurance regime have
occurred when public concern about access to and the price of insurance has put the issue on
the political agenda. This occurred, for example, in the mid to late 1980s.79 One can foresee
a similar story unfolding in response to a tightening insurance market as climate change
proceeds.
D.

NATURAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN NEW ZEALAND

In New Zealand, the risk of earthquake is significant. The country experiences a level of
earthquake activity similar to California. There is a magnitude 8 earthquake about once a
century, a magnitude 7 once a decade, and a magnitude 6 once a year on average. It is
predicted that there is a 12 percent chance of a 7.5 magnitude earthquake occurring in the
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area of Wellington, the capital city, within the next 30 years.80 There are also active
volcanoes in New Zealand, and its climate, even before global climate change, is such that
severe flooding is a regular occurrence.
The risks posed by these phenomena present challenges for the insurance industry.81 Given
the uncertainties surrounding events such as these and, in particular, the potential magnitude
of loss given the numbers of people likely to be affected, insurers have found it difficult to
offer affordable insurance to cover them. In 1944, when the government first addressed the
problem, it was estimated that, because the risks were “unascertainable,” premiums for
earthquake insurance were three to four times that for fire insurance.82
The government’s response was to establish a commission to administer a scheme to
provide compensation for earthquake loss. The concept was a state-run scheme to work in
conjunction with private insurance to extend protection beyond that which could reasonably
be provided by the industry alone. As stated by the Minister of Finance when introducing the
bill, “[t]he endeavour has been to work out a principle under which the whole loss is deemed
to be a national loss, and under which those people who might be affected will subscribe
towards a fund to meet losses which may come to any of them.”83 The essentials of the
scheme were as follows. People who purchased insurance on buildings from the private
market were levied an additional amount to cover earthquake loss (which was invariably
excluded under insurance policies themselves). This was collected by insurers and passed on
to what was then called the Earthquake and War Damage Commission, which administered
the fund so established. Only those who had purchased insurance were eligible. Claims were
made directly to the Commission.
In 1993, the terms of coverage were redefined.84 Coverage was restricted to residential
property and limited to $100,000 for buildings and $20,000 for contents. Despite the
renaming of the agency to the “Earthquake Commission,” covered perils included not only
earthquake, but also natural landslip, volcanic eruption, hydrothermal activity, tsunami,
flood, as well as fire caused by any of the above.85 The Commission’s liability was
reinsured.86 In 2010, the premium was 5 cents per $100 of value of the insured property, up
to a maximum of $67.50 per year,87 but following the major earthquakes in Christchurch in
2010 and 2011, those numbers have been increased substantially so that the premium is now
15 cents per $100, to a maximum of $207 per year.88
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Note that, because of the restrictions that apply (exclusion of commercial property and a
limit of $100,000), this is not the model for a comprehensive plan. For full protection, most
owners of real property need to augment the protection provided by the government scheme
through private insurance. Thus, for residential property, the scheme effectively allows a
homeowner to buy private insurance to which a $100,000 deductible applies, making
affordable coverage more feasible. On the other hand, to achieve the same effect, commercial
property owners have to self-insure for $100,000. For many, this may not be feasible.
In 1993, when changes were made to the New Zealand scheme, the relevance of climate
change was not lost on legislators. As one Member of Parliament said:
I think the truth is that, given some of the evidence we are now getting about global climate change and all
of those other atmospheric effects, there will be more natural emergencies and natural disasters than we have
in recent years. That pressure will increase rather than reduce, which will mean that New Zealand’s ability
to obtain reinsurance will always be difficult, and that, in turn, will mean that the pressure on our Earthquake
Commission to be sharp, flexible, and able to take advantage of opportunities in a much more dynamic way
than perhaps has been the case to date, will be important.89

Thus, a scheme born in other circumstances is now seen as part of an appropriate response
to the insurance-related consequences of climate change.
E.

BRITISH COLUMBIA DISASTER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The British Columbia Disaster Financial Assistance Program is a government-sponsored
insurance plan for harm to persons or property caused by natural disasters.90 There are two
types of claims depending on whether the damage was caused by the government’s actions
to prevent or alleviate harm, or by the disaster itself. If someone’s property is damaged by
government action, the government is required to fully compensate that person for their loss91
without delay.92 Claims based on harm caused by the disaster itself relate to an incident that
“is caused by accident, fire, explosion or technical failure or by the forces of nature
[resulting] in serious harm to … safety … or in widespread damage to property.”93
After a disaster, the government sets the criteria for eligibility for disaster financial
assistance.94 Adjusters are then appointed, and applicants fill out an application form.95 The
adjuster makes a recommendation for the amount of assistance. If applicants are not satisfied
with the award, they can appeal.96 In order to be eligible for assistance, applicants must have
taken sufficient action to protect their property.97 This could mean taking physical steps to
prevent damage from the impending disaster, or holding sufficient insurance. If insurance
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was reasonably and readily available for the damage that was suffered, the damage will not
be compensated through this program.98 One specific example is that there is no assistance
available for flood damage to structures in a flood plain unless they were properly
protected.99
Guidelines for determining what damage is eligible for relief are laid out in the Emergency
Program Act.100 In general, only repairs that are necessary to a home, livelihood, or
community service organization are eligible.101 For damage to eligible personal property, the
amount granted is the lesser of the cost to repair the item and the cost to replace the item with
a basic model.102 For damage to structures, the amount granted is the lowest of the following:
the cost to rebuild the structure, the cost to replace the structure, and the assessed value of
the structure.103 Relief is limited to 80 percent of the amount over $1,000, up to a maximum
award of $300,000.104
Where a disaster is caused by the acts or omissions of an individual or organization, the
responsible party must reimburse the government for its expenditures on prevention and
alleviation of the harm caused by the disaster.105 If there are multiple causes, each
contributing party must pay the portion of government expenditures equal to the portion of
liability attributed to them.106
In sum, the British Columbia Disaster Financial Assistance Program is essentially a
government insurance plan with a 20 percent deductible. It covers only damage to property
necessary for a home, livelihood, or community service organization. Individuals are
expected to take all reasonable steps to protect their property, including holding private
insurance.
F.

UNITED STATES FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

The United States’ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is focused on
meeting the basic needs of those affected by a disaster rather than on providing insurance
coverage. FEMA was created and is controlled by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act.107 Disaster relief is funded by the federal, state, and local
governments. The share of costs borne by the federal government varies from 7 percent to
100 percent depending on the nature of the expense.108 The federal government will grant
loans to state or local governments if they cannot bear their share of the financial burden.
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FEMA provides relief for harm caused by a major disaster. A major disaster can either be
a natural disaster or a fire, flood, or explosion with any cause.109 The first priority of FEMA
is to ensure the health and safety of residents affected by the disaster. To this end, necessary
medicine, medical equipment, and food are provided. Other necessary measures, such as
debris removal, search and rescue, emergency shelter and care, road clearance, demolition
of unsafe structures, warning of further risks, and rescue and care of pets and animals are
undertaken immediately following a disaster with no application procedures necessary.110
Most disaster relief money for rebuilding homes and businesses is provided in the form of
loans from the Small Business Administration.111
The Individuals and Households Program (IHP) within FEMA covers necessary expenses
for establishing a safe living place in the wake of a disaster. IHP does not cover business
losses or losses that are covered by the individual’s insurance.112 If the relevant insurance
policy is insufficient, federal aid may still be granted.113 Generally, individuals are not
required to have insurance in order to be eligible for aid. However, those in flood hazard
areas will only get aid if they have sufficient flood insurance. If they do not have flood
insurance, they may still be able to get aid for expenses that would not have been covered
by the insurance anyway.114 Sometimes when an individual receives federal disaster
assistance, there is a condition that they must then purchase reasonable insurance against
future loss. If they fail to do so, any future claims will be denied.115 Only primary residences
are eligible; IHP will not provide funding for damage to secondary or vacation homes. The
maximum assistance that any individual or household can receive through the IHP is
US$25,000.116
Several types of assistance are available. The government may provide financial assistance
to rent temporary housing at fair market value, or may provide free temporary housing for
up to 18 months.117 IHP may cover repairs to structures to bring them to a safe and sanitary
living condition,118 but will not pay extra to return the home to its pre-disaster condition.119
Eligible hazard mitigation modifications to reduce the likelihood of future damage are
covered.120 Replacement or rebuilding costs may be provided, especially in rural settings
where temporary housing is not available.121 Medical, dental, and funeral expenses caused
by the disaster may be covered.122 Personal property, including vehicles, is also covered.123
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In some situations, the government can recoup some of its outlays. A person who
intentionally causes a situation resulting in federal assistance must compensate the
government for reasonable costs incurred in responding to the emergency. If there are
multiple causes, each individual must compensate for the portion of the costs that are
attributable to their intentional act or omission.124 Note that, unlike the British Columbia
Disaster Financial Assistance program, only intentional acts attract the obligation to
reimburse the government.
VII. INTERNATIONAL LAW, CLIMATE, AND CANADA
Any inquiry about compensation plans necessarily involves the question of who pays. In
this question, the issue of compensation is, or at least can be, connected to the issue of
accountability. Ideally, the funds for compensating the harmed come from those who cause
the harm. This is a basic application of corrective justice theory. But it also raises issues of
deterrence. If payment can be connected to harm caused, it is possible to introduce incentives
to reduce harm in exchange for reduced responsibility for payment. These principles apply
in theory both under international law and under domestic law.
Thus, in thinking in a preliminary way about funding mechanisms, we can see the
theoretical attraction of drawing contributions from those who contribute to the problem. If
it is possible to identify those who cause or at least contribute to the problem (emitters of
GHGs), they should pay. The mechanism might be subrogation by private or government
insurers or direct levying, but emitters would pay. However, as we saw when discussing
liability insurance, there are difficulties in establishing, let alone enforcing, tort rights. This
applies not only to insured defendants in respect of liability insurance, but also in respect of
first party insurers seeking to exercise subrogation rights. This problem does not necessarily
apply to governments who could require, by legislation, financial contributions from emitters
without proof of individual culpability for specific harm, much like workers’ compensation.
Beyond that, governments have at least a theoretical source of reimbursement through
international law. One reality of climate change is that its causes are not confined within
national boundaries. Therefore, while it is possible to have a wholly domestic scheme to deal
with compensation within the jurisdiction, it is not possible to have a causer-pays scheme
within a single jurisdiction. This is where international law should, in theory, step in. If the
basic principles of corrective justice were applied at the international level, then the ideal
solution would be for states to contribute to an International Climate Change Compensation
Fund (ICCCF) in proportion to their emissions. States whose residents suffer climate changerelated loss would then claim from that fund to help defray their costs in contributing to their
domestic compensation schemes. This idea would appear consistent with the “do no harm”
principle of international environmental law, according to which states have “the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”125
In a sense, it would be like a workers’ compensation scheme writ large. But in reality, there
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are many complicating factors. In addition to the complexity of calculating which emissions
should be attributed to which state126 is the problem of calculating responsibility for historic
emissions. If the fund is designed on a going forward basis, then developing countries will
see it as unfair, due in part to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,”127
a principle of international environmental law that underpins the global climate regime.128
Yet, politically, developed countries will be reluctant to acknowledge legal responsibility for
past emissions.129 An additional complication is whether contributions should be calculated
to reflect per capita emissions, or total state emissions.130 As will be seen below, while the
international law of state responsibility and state liability could be called upon to support the
creation of an ICCCF drawing contributions from states, the current international climate law
regime does not in fact reflect this understanding of state obligations. Instead, the focus at
the international level has been on the mitigation of climate change, and the creation of
climate adaptation funds for the least developed countries most likely to be severely impacted
by climate change.
An alternate approach at the international level would be to require large industrial
emitters to contribute directly to the ICCCF in proportion to their emissions.131 This would
be in keeping with the polluter pays principle,132 and would be consistent with the idea of
international civil liability. As will be seen below, however, while making the polluter pay
is in theory a principle of international environmental law, in practice the development of
international civil liability has been limited to select areas of high risk activity. Moreover,
states have been notoriously slow to develop international law relating to liability and
compensation for environmental harm more generally that would ensure that polluters pay,
and also provide a remedy to those harmed by breaches of the “do no harm” principle.133
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adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control
to areas beyond their jurisdiction [emphasis added].
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Finally, increasing attention is being given at the international level to conceptualizing
climate harms as human rights violations. Thus, it is necessary to also consider how
international human rights law might inform the creation and structure of an ICCCF, whether
paid into by states or industrial emitters. The increasing attention being given to the human
rights dimension of climate change is consistent with concerns over equity in relation to
climate harms. Scholars such as Philip Cullet have argued that the international community
should turn its attention to creating a liability regime to compensate those who suffer the
most from climate harms.134 Cullet argues that the liability regime must be international
because of the inequality inherent in the climate change problem. Most of the GHG
emissions have been from wealthy northern nations, while most of the negative effects will
be suffered by poor southern nations. In addition, the poorest communities within nations are
both the most affected by climate changes and the least capable of adapting to them.135
But is an ICCCF feasible? The answer requires consideration of (a) public international
law relating to state responsibility, state liability, and civil liability for climate harms, in
terms of both international environmental and human rights dimensions, and (b) the nature
of the current international climate regime and Canada’s relationship to it, including
contributions Canada already makes to international climate funds and the implications of
Canada’s recent withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change.136
A.

RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

1.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

Under customary international law, state responsibility is triggered when a state breaches
an international legal obligation.137 In other words, for the secondary rules of state
responsibility to be invoked, a state must first have engaged in wrongful conduct by
breaching a primary rule of international law. Harm that results from state conduct without
such a breach does not create state responsibility.138 The wrongful conduct must be
attributable to the state, which creates complications where non-state actor conduct is
implicated.139 Furthermore, states are only responsible for actions that were breaches of an
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obligation in existence at the time they occurred.140 It is unclear how this would apply in the
climate change context due to the significance of historic emissions and the evolution of
knowledge relating to climate harms.
Even if a state has breached an international obligation, state responsibility must first be
invoked by an injured state.141 A state is considered to be injured if the obligation is owed to
it individually, or to a group of states of which it is a member (obligations erga omnes
partes), or to the international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes), “so long as
it is specially affected by the breach or the breach radically changes the position of the states
to which the obligation is owed.”142 State responsibility may also be invoked by uninjured
states, with limitations on what can be claimed from the responsible state.143 If a state is
found in breach of an international obligation owed to an injured state, the law of state
responsibility requires that state to cease the violation, offer assurances of non-repetition, and
make full reparation in the form of restitution, compensation for damage, and satisfaction.144
In theory then, the international law of state responsibility could support the creation of
a fund such as the ICCCF, if the primary rules of international law support the existence of
an international obligation for states to prevent climate harms and to remedy existing harms
arising from climate emissions. As will be seen below, the current international climate
regime itself does not in fact take this approach, although some scholars have argued that it
can be interpreted to create such a primary rule.145 Moreover, as noted above, while the
international environmental law principle of “do no harm” appears to support this existence
of such an obligation, in practice, the “do no harm” principle is best understood as an
obligation of due diligence.146
The “do no harm” principle is reflected in the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,147 which provides in Article 3 that states
should take “all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any
event to minimize the risk therof.”148 If this is considered a primary rule of international law,
then its violation could trigger state responsibility.149 The phrase “all appropriate measures”
refers to both the steps specified in the draft articles, and to the state of origin’s obligation
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to “adopt and implement national legislation incorporating accepted international
standards.”150 However, for a violation to be found, the complaining state must show a lack
of due diligence on the part of the acting state.151 There is also the question of whether
activities which give rise to climate harms fit within the definition of “hazardous activities”
to which the Prevention Articles would apply, specifically, what threshold of GHG emissions
would be considered sufficient to cause “significant” harm? Nor is it clear what would be
considered “accepted international standards” in the climate context. An alternate basis upon
which state responsibility for the prevention of environmental climate harms could be
grounded is the precautionary principle.152 The precautionary principle could in theory
support a primary rule of international law to prevent the gradual degradation of the
atmosphere by requiring states to reduce emissions even in the absence of scientific
certainty.153
The ILC’s 2006 Loss Allocation Principles propose a second set of primary rules that seek
to compensate victims of harm by ensuring that operators are held strictly liable.154 Principle
3 provides that one of the purposes of the Loss Allocation Principles is to “ensure prompt and
adequate compensation to victims of transboundary damage.”155 Principle 4 provides that
each state “should take all necessary measures to ensure that prompt and adequate
compensation is available for victims of transboundary damage” which “should include the
imposition of liability on the operator or, where appropriate, other person or entity” and
“should not require proof of fault.”156 If the Loss Allocation Principles reflect the primary
rules of international law,157 then states that have failed to impose strict liability on GHG
emitters for transboundary harms and have failed to compensate victims of transboundary
harms would have breached a primary rule of international law. The difficulty would be
finding a victim state to invoke state responsibility for this type of violation, given that the
primary rule is designed to compensate individual victims, rather than victim states.
A similar issue arises with the law of state responsibility if climate change harms are
viewed as international human rights violations, given that the rights holders are individuals
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or groups but not states.158 Increasingly, the human rights implications of climate change
have been recognized within international law.159 Moreover, the obligation of states to
regulate businesses to prevent and remedy human rights violations is also recognized under
international human rights law.160 Again, however, there is the technical difficulty under the
law of state responsibility of finding a victim state to invoke this responsibility.
Conceptually, then, the Prevention Articles, Loss Allocation Principles, and international
human rights law place the burden of preventing and compensating climate harms on states.
In theory, states are under an obligation to regulate private actors to prevent harm and ensure
that polluters pay compensation to victims. If these obligations are not complied with, then
victim states could invoke the state responsibility of emitter states and seek a remedy
including compensation. Because in the climate context many states are not complying with
the above primary rules, the creation of an ICCCF would be theoretically consistent with an
idea of state responsibility for breaches of international obligations. If states were in
compliance, the need for an ICCCF would be limited to residual harms not captured by the
regulatory and compensatory systems already implemented by states, and would amount to
a regime of state liability, as will be discussed below.
The idea of state responsibility for climate harms is useful for conceptualizing
compensation for climate change damage because there are many individual emitters (such
as drivers of automobiles) who bear a low level of individual responsibility for climate
change, and do not control the environmental policies that determine how much they emit.161
It is more practical to make the state responsible for failing to institute effective
environmental policies than to try to hold each individual private emitter liable.162
In practice, however, state responsibility is not (yet) effective at compensating climate
change damage. Aside from questions relating to the invocation of state responsibility,163 one
of the main problems that plagues climate change litigation, as noted earlier, is proof of
causation.164 With scientific uncertainty, many emitters, and many other natural factors, it is
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extremely difficult to prove direct causation between a country’s high GHG emissions and
a specific harm suffered. Because historic emissions are likely not compensable under state
responsibility, even if the amount of climate change caused by those emissions is sufficient
to cause the harm, the complaining state will not be compensated. In addition, like most
international law, state responsibility is anthropocentric. Harm to humans and property can
be compensated, but it is much more difficult to provide compensation for non-economic
harm to the environment.165
2.

STATE LIABILITY AND CIVIL LIABILITY

Two alternate approaches to the compensation of climate harms under international law
are state liability and civil liability. While state responsibility requires a state to engage in
internationally wrongful conduct before being required to compensate for harms, state
liability is designed to capture those situations where a state has harmed another state, yet
has not engaged in wrongful conduct. As the primary rule obligations described above often
require states to act with due diligence to prevent significant harms, gaps in coverage arise
where a harm nevertheless ensues despite a state having met its due diligence obligation or
where the threshold of harm caused by an individual state does not meet that of significant
harm, which is a potential issue in the climate context.166 State liability is essentially strict
liability for state actions, and while not often invoked, may be considered a subsidiary
liability that could compensate harms not covered by state responsibility or international civil
liability.167
Strict state liability could be very beneficial for a climate change compensation system.
It is designed to protect innocent victims of a foreign nation’s decisions from being forced
to bear the risks of those decisions.168 Individuals rely on their government to be the insurer
of last resort against natural disasters, which will be the main type of damage suffered due
to climate change.169 They would be represented by their government against the government
of the emitting states, and then compensated by their government. Yet while the appeal to
strict state liability is obvious, it has rarely been used in international law; the exceptions
being to compensate for damage caused by space objects and damage to Antarctica,170 as well
as to compensate victims of harm caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.171
State liability is a popular theoretical approach to compensation of environmental harms.
It would provide better protection for the most vulnerable populations in the world and would
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force the countries that most benefit from polluting behavior to pay the true cost. Despite the
appeal, there are many practical difficulties to instituting and using a state liability regime.
First of all, it is difficult to apportion responsibility when several states have contributed to
the harm.172 Joint and several liability would be complex, as it would require the injured state
to make a complaint of every emitting state. A potentially devastating setback is that claims
can only be brought against states that have agreed to participate in the regime.173 The idea
of even residual state liability is rejected by many states.174 Indeed, it is this political reality
that led the ILC to focus on the allocation of loss to private actors rather than continuing with
the project of state liability as initially proposed.175 As discussed above, the Loss Allocation
Principles support states imposing strict liability on private actors, but do not support
imposing strict liability on states unless they are themselves the operator of the project.176
An alternate approach is that of international civil liability. Similar to domestic tort law,
international civil liability would ensure that private actors are held liable for damage caused
by their activities and must pay reparation to the victims. In the climate change context, such
a regime would be based on strict liability for emissions.
International liability agreements have several common traits. Liability is generally strict,
with a defined set of exceptions.177 Liability is limited both in monetary amount and in
time.178 Mandatory insurance is often stipulated, and in some cases so are supplementary
compensation funds.179 Although harm to the environment is taken into account when
determining damages, there is no economic compensation for irreversible non-economic
damage to the environment.180 Such civil liability regimes are politically unpopular, however,
and the only ones currently in force are for nuclear and oil pollution.181 The suddenness of
nuclear accidents and oil spills is very different from the gradual degradation caused by GHG
emissions. Moreover, instituting an international civil liability regime for climate change
damage would be politically challenging.182 Without comprehensive coverage, the regime
might not only fail but also harm the states that agree to it, as their large emitters flee to other
nations to escape liability. If climate harms were viewed as human rights violations, a
conceptually parallel idea would be for businesses to hold direct obligations under
international human rights law, including obligations to respect the rights of those who could
be impacted by climate harms. The recent Guiding Principles on business and human rights
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do recognize the corporate responsibility to respect rights, although not as a legal obligation
under international law.183
International civil liability is arguably the most intuitively satisfying solution to climate
change compensation, despite the complexity of identifying sources of anthropogenic climate
change. According to the polluter pays principle, all the costs of pollution, including
compensation to victims, should be borne by the polluting entity.184 As private emitters have
caused much of the damage to the atmosphere, it follows that they should bear the burden
of the consequences.185 Following the polluter pays principle would force private emitters to
internalize the true costs of their behavior, which should theoretically force them to behave
more efficiently and provide strong incentives for decreasing emissions.186 However,
incentives will only be correctly aligned if polluters have to pay for almost all the damage
caused by their emissions, which is not the case in most environmental liability regimes
because of the investment and skill needed to bring a complaint.187 International civil liability
could also provide a good backup system for when state responsibility fails to compensate
victims, especially if it were based on strict liability.188 Notably, Principle 7 of the Loss
Allocation Principles specifically encourages states to conclude “specific global, regional or
bilateral agreements” in respect of particular categories of hazardous activities, including
within them arrangements for industry and state funds to provide supplementary
compensation.189 However, as will be seen below, no conceptually comparable funds have
been created in the climate context.
The idea of international civil liability accords with an ICCCF into which polluting
companies are required to pay. Yet, while theoretically interesting, there are few existing
models, and in the climate context such an arrangement appears politically impossible.
B.

CANADA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE REGIME

Under current international law, 195 states, including Canada and all major GHG emitter
states, are parties to the UNFCCC,190 which came into force in 1994.191 The UNFCCC and
related agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol are designed with the primary goals of cutting
greenhouse gas emissions, and funding climate change adaptation in developing countries.
State parties to the UNFCCC have committed themselves to contributing to several climate
related funds. However, these funds are conceptually different from an ICCCF due to the
focus on mitigation and adaptation rather than compensation for climate harms. Interestingly,
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while an international insurance pool was proposed by the Alliance of Small Island States
in 1991, this was rejected.192
1.

UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

The basic objective of the UNFCCC according to Article 2 is “not to reverse greenhouse
gas emissions but to stabilize them ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.’”193 Article 3 of the UNFCCC incorporates several
principles from the Rio Declaration, including endorsements of equity and “common but
differentiated responsibility,” the principle of intergenerational equity, and the precautionary
approach. The distinction between developed and developing states forms an integral part
of the UNFCCC,194 with developed nations and economies in transition (Annex I parties)
agreeing to undertake specific emissions goals and commitments, while developing nations
undertake to mitigate climate change without specific targets.195 All parties must report on
their efforts, subject to capacity.196 In addition, developed countries (Annex II parties)
commit to providing financial resources and technology transfer to developing country
parties in order to enable them to meet their reporting and mitigation commitments under the
UNFCCC.197 Developed countries also commit to assisting developing countries that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to cover the costs of
adaptation.198 Article 11 of the UNFCCC creates a financial mechanism, which was entrusted
on an interim basis to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).199
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Ibid, Article 4(3), (5), (7).
Ibid, Article 4(4). See also ibid, Article 4(8).
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depletion, international waters, biodiversity conservation, desertification and deforestation, and
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KYOTO PROTOCOL

The Kyoto Protocol sets legally binding emission reduction targets to reduce GHGs of
developed country parties for a commitment period of 2008-2012.200 The Kyoto Protocol
was adopted at the third session of the Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan in 1997, and
entered into force in 2005, after ratification by the Russian Federation, an Annex I party.201
Among the notable features of the Kyoto Protocol are flexibility mechanisms to facilitate the
meeting of targets. These include emissions trading,202 joint implementation by developed
countries,203 and the clean development mechanism,204 which permits private or public parties
from developed countries to work with developing countries to undertake projects for which
certified emission reductions units are awarded.205 The Kyoto Protocol created two financial
mechanisms, the first aimed at further assisting the least developed countries to fund the
costs of adaptation,206 while the second further committed developed country parties to
support an adaptation fund for developing countries.207
Canada signed the Kyoto Protocol on 29 April 1998, and ratified it on 17 December
2002.208 As noted above, the Kyoto Protocol came into force for all state parties in 2005. Yet,
while Canada ratified the Protocol, there was no real plan for effective implementation. In
response, the House of Commons passed a private member’s bill called the Kyoto Protocol
Implementation Act209 which mandated the Minster of the Environment to create a yearly
Climate Change Plan that would describe the “measures to be taken to ensure that Canada
meets its obligations”210 under the Kyoto Protocol. A Climate Change Plan was adopted,211
but its adequacy was challenged in a judicial review application brought on behalf of Friends
of the Earth Canada, who claimed that the content of the Climate Change Plan was not
sufficient for Canada to be in compliance with its Kyoto Protocol obligations.212 This judicial
review failed on the basis that while the failure to prepare a plan might be justiciable, an
evaluation of its content was not.213
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Despite this, on 12 December 2011214 the Minister of the Environment announced
Canada’s intent to formally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that for Canada to
meet the Kyoto targets, it would have to spend $14 billion to buy carbon credits. Moreover,
Canada took the position that it would not meet its GHG reduction commitments unless key
GHG contributors from the developing world had committed to binding targets as well.215
This withdrawal has not gone unchallenged, as former MP Daniel Turp filed a motion to the
Federal Court to challenge the legality of Canada’s withdrawal.216 However, the application
for judicial review was rejected by the Federal Court in July 2012.217
3.

BALI, COPENHAGEN, CANCUN, AND DURBAN

There have been several attempts to negotiate further developments in the climate regime.
The 2007 Bali Climate Change Conference led to the adoption of the Bali Roadmap.218 The
2009 Conference of the Parties resulted in the Copenhagen Accord,219 in which developed
and developing countries, including the United States and China, agreed aspirationally to the
need to limit warming to 2NC on a global level.220 In addition to differing degrees of
commitment to climate change mitigation on the part of developed and developing country
parties, the Copenhagen Accord identified new funding commitments.221 These included a
collective commitment by developed countries of $30 billion in “new and additional”
resources in 2010-2012 to help developing countries reduce emissions, preserve forests, and
adapt to climate change, as well as a goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and
private finance by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.222
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In 2010, the parties met in Cancun, Mexico. Building upon the meeting in Copenhagen,
developed countries agreed to reduce emissions in alignment with a 2NC increase, relying
on a quantified economy-wide emission reduction target, and a registry was created for
actions of developing countries in reducing emissions.223 Furthermore, three specific
institutions were created to coordinate international action to adapt and mitigate the impacts
of climate change: (1) a Green Climate Fund224 for the deployment and accountability of
funds for developing countries, (2) a Technology Mechanism225 to ensure clean technologies
arrive in a timely manner where needed, and (3) an Adaptation Framework226 to increase
international co-operation to assist developing countries in protecting themselves from the
impacts of climate change. Additionally, the Cancun Agreements “[encourage] all Parties to
find effective ways to reduce the human pressure on forests that results in greenhouse gas
emissions, including actions to address drivers of deforestation.”227
At the December 2011 meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC in Durban, South Africa,
an agreement was reached to negotiate a legally binding treaty for the reduction of emissions
in both developed and developing nations by 2015. In particular, Article 4 of Decision 1
states that:
[T]he Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as early
as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed
outcome with legal force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come into
effect and be implemented from 2020.228

Notably, the latest meeting in Doha, Qatar in 2012 (the eighteenth Conference of the Parties)
adopted a decision that specifically explored “approaches to address loss and damage
associated with climate change impacts in developing countries.”229
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CONCLUSIONS: CLIMATE FUNDS AND CANADA

As can be seen from the above overview, a key element of the climate regime is the need
for developed countries to fund adaptation and mitigation efforts by developing countries,
in particular those most vulnerable to climate harms. Specific funds were set up over the
years,230 and Canada has contributed or pledged contributions to many. For example, the
Special Climate Change Fund,231 the Least Developed Countries Fund,232 and the Adaptation
Fund233 were all set in 2001 at the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties in
Marrakech. Canada has contributed to various climate funds over the year.234 However, the
entire climate regime is designed around the need to fund adaptation and mitigation efforts
by poorer countries, not around ideas of corrective justice or deterrence, or even
implementation of the polluter pays principle. Accordingly, despite various funding
mechanisms, there is no existing model within the global climate regime that reflects the
compensation function of the proposed ICCCF.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The current international climate change regime is focused on mitigation and adaptation,
and does not mirror the principles of corrective justice, deterrence, or polluter pays that are
implicit within the structure of insurance law. While some scholars have argued for the need
for a liability regime to protect the populations most vulnerable to climate change,235 the
reality is that even if such a regime were implemented on a global scale, developed countries
like Canada, which are high emitters and the least vulnerable, would be paying into such a
regime, not receiving compensation from it.236 Accordingly, even if an ICCCF were
230
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politically feasible, which appears highly unlikely, any such fund would not be likely to
provide a source of funding for a Canadian climate insurance mechanism. Therefore, the
solution to the problems facing Canadian climate insurers and ordinary Canadians must, as
a result, come from within Canada itself.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to seriously canvass internal solutions to the
climate insurance problem, some ideas will be tentatively proposed here. One idea is that
Canada could implement a carbon tax, with the funds collected used to support a climate
compensation insurance fund. While numerous jurisdictions have implemented carbon taxes
already, including Quebec and British Columbia,237 it does not appear that funds collected
from a carbon tax have been used for such an insurance purpose. For example, climate tax
funds have been used to support carbon mitigation programs,238 income tax reductions to
individuals,239 and the supplementation of government budgets,240 but not for compensating
climate-related damage. In Canada, the idea of a federal carbon tax has not been well
received by Canadians in previous federal elections.241 It is noteworthy that various
jurisdictions have implemented drought and flood taxes to raise money for natural disaster
funds,242 but none have specifically adopted a carbon tax for this purpose.
Yet the idea has interesting possibilities. A carbon tax could fund a disaster relief scheme
to replace or supplement private insurance. The scheme could be modeled on that in place
in British Columbia, or in New Zealand. Or it could be in the nature of workers’
compensation in the sense that funding would be drawn proportionately from all identified
emitters without connecting any single emitter to any single claimant. Because some climate
change causing emissions come from other countries, this would not be a complete causerpay scheme; however, it would still go some way to reflecting corrective justice and would
impose incentives to reduce emissions. Clearly the details of obligations to contribute and
entitlements to claim would require considerable attention, but unless people are to be left
to self-insure risks that cannot be covered by the private insurance market, government
involvement, in some form, is the only solution.
Some climate-related risks will continue to be covered by private insurance. Accordingly,
an additional idea would be to ensure that insurers themselves play a role through the
implementation of best practices for themselves and their clients. These include: (1)
maintaining insurance for extreme weather events; (2) improving modeling by incorporating
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climate change risk; (3) using contracts to encourage clients to engage in loss prevention; (4)
developing new products to encourage the use of climate friendly technology; (5) changing
investment portfolios to include more climate friendly businesses; (6) participating in carbon
markets as an investor and an insurer; (7) minimizing their own carbon footprint; (8)
educating customers about how to minimize climate-related risks; and (9) engaging in public
policy discussions about these risks.243 In Canada, Feltmate and Thistlethwaite have further
recommended: (1) incorporating expectations regarding future climate into the building code
process;244 (2) identifying high priority risks linked with future extreme weather;245 (3)
creating insurance and government incentives for homeowner risk reduction;246 (4) the
adaptation of the FireSmart model for urban flood and wind;247 (5) the provision of disaster
mitigation assistance in Canada;248 (6) educating homeowners and business on the role of
insurance;249 and (7) developing better data to estimate the risk of severe weather damage.250
Clearly, without government intervention of some kind, the private insurance market,
operating within the legal regime designed to protect its financial viability, will not be able
to provide for all climate-related losses even if those exposed to such risks want to purchase
insurance to cover those losses. And notwithstanding the external contribution to climaterelated loss in Canada and the theoretical promise of international law, any government
intervention will need to be entirely domestic. It remains to be seen whether government
intervention will indeed be forthcoming to protect Canadians from the anticipated high costs
of uninsurable climate harms, and if so, in what form.
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